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    Abstract—This paper applies two experimental economics 
methods (i.e. agent-based modeling and laboratory experiment) to a 
market test suite that is based on a fictional European wholesale 
electricity market. Quantitative results of generators’ strategic 
behavior in this market context are separated between generators 
played by human subjects (i.e. master students) in a laboratory 
experiment and generators represented by computational agents in 
an agent-based model. The behavior is measured through offers 
that students or agents make when participating in the electricity 
trading auction and the market outcomes under both methods are 
discussed in order to illustrate the difference between the behavior 
of human and computational agents. The paper also identifies the 
improvements that would need to be made to the market test suite 
to allow for a more conclusive comparison in future experiments.         
Index Terms— Electricity market, experimental economics, 
simulation game, agent- based modeling, strategic behavior. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
xperience with electricity markets worldwide provides 
evidence that market design affects market performance 
[1]. Testing the efficiency of market design in the real world can 
be costly, so it is desirable to simulate market behavior to 
anticipate problems before the implementation of new designs 
[2].  
Game theory (or equilibrium modeling) [3]-[8] has been the 
dominant approach for simulating market behavior. This 
approach is however limited in capturing the dynamics of the 
liberalized electricity market [9]. Therefore, more flexible 
models coming from experimental and computational economics 
are increasingly used. The computational method (i.e. agent-
based modeling [10]-[18]) is strong in studying systems that are 
complex, while laboratory experiments [19]-[22] could provide 
information on how people behave and learn in a given 
environment. Most studies consider the behavior of certain 
players in a particular market design [11], [12] or compare the 
impact of design options on specific players or the system as a 
whole [13], [14]. Laboratory experiments study the behavior of 
human subjects in a controlled market environment and they 
have also been used in university laboratories for educational 
purposes [19], [20]. 
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Together with the rise of new market study methods, several 
researchers started comparing these experimental economics 
approaches with the traditional game theoretic approaches. For 
example, [23] uses a simple 3 nodes market to compare the 
result of an Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraint 
(EPEC) model with that of a Reinforcement Learning agent-
based model. In [24], a pool market with inelastic and constant 
loads is the environment for comparing Nash equilibrium 
analysis and agent-based modeling using Q-learning.  
The contribution of this paper is to provide an initial 
comparison of computational agent-based and laboratory 
experiments with a market test suite that is based on a fictional 
European electricity market. The approach used does not allow 
us to be conclusive, but the results illustrate that this is a 
promising line of research that merits further investigation, and 
we give some recommendations for this.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
briefly presents and characterizes the two approaches, as well as 
identifies their advantages and limitations. Section III describes 
the case study and settings by which the two approaches are 
applied. Quantitative results of the computational agent-based 
models and lab experiments are presented in section IV. Based 
on the results, detailed analysis and comparison on the 
experiments’ and models’ settings are discussed in section V. 
Finally, section VI concludes the paper.   
II. CHARACTERIZING THE TWO APPROACHES 
In this section, the laboratory experiment and agent-based 
modeling are presented together with their advantages and 
limitations.  
A. Laboratory experiments 
Laboratory experiments – or in this paper, laboratory 
simulation games – are applications of experimental economics 
which have human subjects as agents to study economics 
theories and systems. The computerization of experiments in 
recent years has made this method sufficiently affordable to be 
performed in universities, serving educational purposes. Also, it 
facilitates tests with more complicated interactions between 
subjects and more sophisticated simulated economic structures 
than “paper-and-pencil” experiments used previously [25]. 
Examples of simulation games in universities about electricity 
markets include [19] and [20]. These laboratory games usually 
focus on competitive trading auctions in the electricity market. 
Students typically take the role of generators which have tools 
for calculating their electricity generation costs so that they can 
formulate their bids. By playing the game repeatedly, students 
obtain practical experience on how trading in a electricity market 
works and how bids and offers should be made.  
In laboratory experiments, the behavior of human subjects can 
be observed in a controlled environment, including their learning 
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process over time. For testing impacts of an environment (e.g. a 
certain kind of market design) on relevant participants, these 
observations are extremely meaningful. However, objections to 
this method also relate to the nature of human subjects. Humans 
are complicated in term of motivation, cognition, preference and 
experience, and so cautious control is required when setting the 
experiment. Laboratory simulation games are also constrained 
by time and number of subjects, which limit their repetition and 
diversity as it actually happens in the real world.  
B. Agent-based modeling 
In models using agent-based modeling, agents are defined to 
“think”, “act” and “react” and to be “goal-oriented” all by 
themselves without interference from modelers during the 
evolution of the system. These features of agents are made 
possible through a “brain” that modelers assign to agents when 
developing the model. The “brain” is a learning algorithm. 
Learning algorithms have been derived from disciplines such as 
psychology (Roth-Erev reinforcement learning [26]), biology 
(genetic algorithms) or computer science (Q-learning).  One 
example of agent-based models is presented in [14] where the 
problem of congestion is dealt with by using generator agents 
that apply Q-learning. Another example can be found in [15], 
where interrelated electricity markets (balancing, day-ahead and 
CO2 emission markets) are subjected to the strategic behavior of 
generator agents. 
Computational agents are less complicated to work with than 
human subjects, but the model set-up is decided initially by 
modelers which can be biased in their choices. More importantly, 
computational agents are criticized for not being able to simulate 
human cognitive characteristics, such as subjective preferences, 
perception and bounded rationality [27], [28], which have a great 
influence in the human decision-making process in reality.  
III.   CASE OF THE ELECTRICITY MARKET TO APPLY THE TWO 
APPROACHES 
In this section, we first describe the market setting in which 
the two approaches are compared and then describe how the 
approaches have applied in this context. 
A. Market setting inspired by the European electricity market 
 
Fig. 1.  European electricity market context for simulation and modeling 
The market context that has been chosen is defined as the 
interconnected market between eight European countries, 
namely France, Spain, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Austria. Each country is considered as a 
node with a fixed aggregated demand curve. Nodes are 
connected with each other by transmission lines with limited 
capacity and equal impedances for each line. Transmission line 
capacities are set up in order to create congestion so that the 
learning experience includes the impact of congestion on the 
market. Fig. 1 describes the network and indicates which lines 
interconnect with which countries (nodes). 
TABLE I 
LIST OF GENERATORS 
No. Name Country 
1 Gen1 Italy  
2 Gen2 Switzerland  
3 Gen3 Germany, Austria, Netherlands 
4 Gen4 France, Germany, Austria 
5 Gen5 Italy 
6 Gen6 France, Belgium, Netherlands 
7 Gen7 Germany 
8 Gen8 France, Spain, Italy 
9 Gen9 Spain, Italy 
10 Gen10 Netherlands  
11 Gen11 Spain  
12 Gen12 Belgium, Netherlands 
13 Gen13 Germany, Austria  
14 Gen14 Germany  
 
There are 14 fictive generators active in this interconnected 
market. As the demand side is considered fixed, the market 
participants that are modeled or play are these 14 market players 
(the market operator is not considered as a player). One 
generator can participate in more than one node and in each node 
his generation is characterized by a given marginal cost curve 
and a maximum capacity of electricity production. That is to say, 
one generator can have different cost structures at different 
nodes. Names of 14 players and their active nodes are listed in 
Table I.  
TABLE II 
GENERATORS’ MARKET SHARES (%) AND MARKETS’ HHI 
Name AT BE DE FR IT NL ES CH 
Gen1     4    
Gen2        50 
Gen3 40  27   10   
Gen4 26  8 88     
Gen5     11    
Gen6  74  2  25   
Gen7   14      
Gen8    1 9  46  
Gen9     67  6  
Gen10      19   
Gen11       45  
Gen12  24    40   
Gen13 20  33      
Gen14   15      
Others 14 2 3 9 9 6 3 50 
HHI 2872 6056 2312 7830 4788 2722 4186 5000 
 
The set of generators and their cost functions have been 
chosen to represent a situation with strongly concentrated 
national electricity markets. The HHI1of each market is provided 
                                                            
1  HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index) is a standard measure of market 
concentration, equaling the sum of squares of the market shares of each 
generator. 
in Table II. A market with an HHI value above 1800 is 
considered as a highly concentrated market. As can be seen in 
Table II, all nodes have HHI values in excess of 2000. This is 
also the situation in most actual electricity markets, as indicated 
in the Energy Sector Inquiry [29].  
Trading is assumed to be concentrated in an hourly day-ahead 
auction. Offers from generators at each node are submitted to the 
auctioneer (i.e. market operator) which then calculates the 
market outcomes, including locational marginal price 2 , the 
resulting trade volumes, transmission flows and network 
congestion.  
B. The KU Leuven lab game 
The game has been developed for the first master year of the 
subject of energy in the engineering department of the KU 
Leuven. Providing that students are unfamiliar with electricity 
markets, the game helps them to understand better the market 
complexities. 
The market is set up as described in the previous section. 
Students play the role of generators who make hourly offers in 
the auction by submitting their supply curves for the next day’s 
delivery to the market operator. Based on a fixed marginal cost 
curve of their own generation (cost of supply in function of the 
volume) in each country they are active, students set up a offer 
curve which they believe would maximize their profit. Setting 
up a “good” offer curve implies that students understand the 
impact of network congestion on prices and take advantage of 
their market power. Naturally, it is hard for students to 
understand these issues from the start, but the game consists of 
several sessions (around 10) to help students learn from their 
previous results and improve their strategic behavior gradually. 
For the first session, students are asked to offer at their marginal 
costs, which then functions as the benchmark for their strategic 
behavior in the following sessions. After the first 5 sessions, 
when students are familiar with the game, realize their optimal 
strategy and observe some phenomena such as there being a very 
high price on the market even when their quantity offers are not 
fully accepted, they are introduced to the concepts of market 
power and congestion. This instruction re-motivates students 
with new interesting concepts and also speeds up the students’ 
learning in the next 5 rounds. Students’ motivation therefore is 
maintained and their results converge in about 10 rounds. 
successive bid curves 
marginal cost 
 
                                                            
2 For a detailed explanation about the calculation of the locational marginal price, 
see [30].   
Fig. 2.  Supply offering curves vs. marginal cost curve  
In the game, students’ offers are submitted via a web browser 
in the form of 10 price limit-volume combinations per country 
per session. These offers are turned into a step function as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. Offers after submission are then put into the 
auction clearing function3, together with demand curves, in order 
to determine which offers should be accepted to maximize the 
total social surplus under the constraint of available transmission 
capacities. After solving the optimization, the market auctioneer 
returns the market outcomes to the students, including the 
market clearing prices at each node, aggregated demand curves, 
and their accepted production volumes (private information). 
Based on these results, students get insights about their profits4 
and consequently set up new offers for the next session. 
C. Modeling the market with agents 
Given the above defined market setting, students can be 
replaced by computational agents.  
Similarly to students, agents in the model are generators 
which – based on their cost structures (i.e. marginal cost curves) 
– create offers for the auction. They also seek for profit 
maximization. Unlike students, agents behave according to a 
fixed set of actions and improve their strategic behavior 
systematically through a defined learning algorithm. This set of 
actions, however, is developed based on equivalent students’ 
choices. In other words, the range of actions of each agent is 
made from actions of students who also play the role of this 
generator. Initially, in the first round, similar to the students, 
agents offer at their marginal cost curves then update the results 
and choose actions for the next round. After several rounds, by 
learning how the previous offering results (the profits they got) 
are, agents become more “expert” in making offers. At a certain 
stage, they finally can optimize their strategic behavior. 
  
Fig. 3.  Process in an agent-based model  
In this paper, the modified Roth-Erev Reinforcement 
Learning algorithm5 has been chosen to be the “brain” of agents. 
The process of thinking, acting and learning of agents in an 
agent-based model is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
                                                            
3 Details about the mathematical algorithm to solve the problem, refer to [31]. 
4 The profit of each generator is calculated simply by deducting their generation 
cost (equaling their accepted volume multiplied by the equivalent marginal cost) 
from their total revenue (equaling their accepted volume multiplied by the 
market clearing price). 
5 For detail explanation of Roth-Erev Reinforcement Learning applied for agent-
based modeling, refer to [32] 
Actions of agents are defined as a number of mark-up values 
which agents add to their marginal costs to construct the supply 
offering curve. In other words, the supply curve of each agent 
has the same shape as their marginal cost curves but shifted 
upwards. Every agent chooses a mark-up value based on the goal 
of profit maximization. In the model of this paper, there are 100 
possible actions agents can choose, equivalent to 100 possible 
mark-up values.  
In the set of agent’s actions, each action has its own specific 
probability to be chosen. This probability is changed (or updated) 
after each market outcomes that agents gain. In the Roth-Erev 
learning approach, the probability of choice is calculated through 
the propensity of the action. In general, the probability that an 
action is chosen over a set of 99 other actions equals to the 
proportion between this action propensity and the total 
propensity of all available actions: 
( )( )                 (1)
( )
ik
ik
ik
k
q tp t
q t
   
In which:   
pik(t) : probability that agent i will chose action k at round t 
qik(t): propensity of action k at round t with agent i 
At the initial round, qik is set based on the parameter “strength 
of initial propensity” – the scaling parameter – s(1) of the 
algorithm. After that, qik is updated after every round. The 
formula to update qik requires to know the reward that the agent 
gains from that round. In this paper, the reward R is defined by 
comparing the agent’s profit of the current round with that of 
previous round:  
 
1       if profit in round t is larger than profit in round t-1
( )
0      otherwisek
R t 
     
With Rk(t) is the reward for agent i of round t in which action 
k is chosen. 
There are two other key parameters of Roth-Erev method 
which are taken into account for updating qik: the recency θ (to 
slowly reduce the importance of the past experience) and the 
experimentation ε (to reinforce actions similar to the current 
choice).  
Combining the 3 parameters, the modified Roth-Erev 
algorithm in this paper updates the propensity qik as follows: 
( 1) (1 ). ( ) ( , ( ))            (2)ik ik j kq t q t E k R t    In 
which:         
(1 ). ( )           if j = k (current action)
( , ( ))
. ( )           if j k (current action)
1
k
j k
k
R t
E k R t
R t
M


  
  
M : total number of available action for agent i. 
The updated propensity qik of each action of each agent at 
each round then leads to the change in the equivalent probability 
pik as in (1). That result will affect the agent’s choice in the next 
round. This loop repeats up to a certain point where agents reach 
their optimal choice of action and the learning process 
consequently converges.  
In order to guarantee an unbiased trend of the model at its 
initial rounds, the agent-based model is set to run several times. 
In this paper, the number of runs is chosen to be 5, and the 
number of iterations within each run is set to 500 rounds. Results 
of the model are the average values of these 5 runs. 
The founders of the Roth-Erev algorithm found in [26] that 
the most suitable set of the algorithm’s three parameters for their 
human studies are: Scaling s(1) = 1, recency θ = 0.1 and 
experimentation ε = 0.2. In [10], authors confirmed this set of 
parameters to be appropriate for their tests. Hence, the agent-
based model of this paper also uses these parameter values. 
IV.  NUMERICAL RESULTS 
In this section, the numerical results of the case study are 
presented, first for each approach separately and then a 
comparison of both approaches. In what follows, two approaches 
are evaluated based on two quantitative indicators of market 
outcomes: nodal market clearing prices and generators’ 
individual profits. 
A. Laboratory sessions’ results 
Different sets of students lead to different results. This section 
presents the average results of 5 lab sessions (the so-called “Lab 
Average”) and the results of 2 individual lab sessions at the KUL 
in 2008 and 2010 (KUL-08 and KUL-10).  
Fig. 4 shows that market clearing prices in lab session KUL-
10 are the smallest among the three presented results while lab 
KUL-08 has the largest ones. The gap between both sessions is 
indeed very large. Price values of the Lab Average are closer to 
the price levels of lab KUL-10. The explanation for this 
observation lies in the fact that lab session KUL-08 is an 
extreme case where the group of students played substantially 
with their mark-up.  
 
Fig. 4.  Market clearing prices of laboratory simulation games 
Although the absolute values of prices significantly differ 
between lab sessions, each individual lab session has its 
consistent trend of prices. If lab KUL-10 has price levels lower 
than 1000 EUR/MWh, this trend can be observed for every 
nodal price. For every node (i.e. country), the market clearing 
price of this node in lab KUL-10 is always smaller than that of 
lab KUL-08 (the lab with higher price level). In other words, the 
results illustrate the students are influenced by their classmates, 
and learning has been different for different groups of students, 
with one group clearly outperforming the other groups. 
The results in terms of generator profits confirm this 
observation (see Fig. 5). Individual profits of generators in lab 
KUL-10 are much smaller than those in lab KUL-08: the 
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smallest profits value differs from 61,960 EUR in KUL-10 to 
508,843 EUR in KUL-08 and has the value of 624,916 EUR in 
the Lab Average. The observation about the consistent trend in 
each lab also persists, i.e. the graph of KUL-08 also completely 
covers that of KUL-10. In addition, in terms of individual profits, 
different lab sessions share the same relative ranking of 
highest/lowest profits among the 14 generators. As illustrated in 
Fig. 5, a generator like Gen4 which trades in highly concentrated 
markets (France) with high market shares (88%) always gains 
the highest profits while Gen1, Gen7 and Gen13 have much less 
profits as they are active in less concentrated markets (Germany), 
and have lower market shares.  
 
 
Fig. 5.  Generators’ profits in laboratory simulation games 
B. Agent-based model’s results 
Unlike students, agents fine-tune their strategies during many 
more rounds and then gain the optimal solution for their 
situation. Agents in our simulation converge after around 100 to 
150 rounds.  
 
Fig. 6.  Market clearing prices evolution of agent-based model 
Fig. 6 illustrates the evolution of nodal market clearing prices 
in the agent-based model (average values of 5 runs). After 
convergence, the electricity price in France is the highest among 
nodes and is around 1700 EUR/MWh. The electricity prices in 
Belgium and Italy – at around 700 EUR/MWh – are the lowest. 
It is observable that prices in countries with more concentration 
(France, Belgium) converge quicker. This can be explained by 
the fact that in a more competitive market (lower concentration) 
it is harder for agents to define the optimal strategy as their 
market power is not strong and the market price is influenced by 
not only one agent but also by other agents’ strategies.  
In line with market prices, generators’ profits reach the 
convergent point after 100 to 150 rounds. However, there are 
large differences between generators’ profit values within a 
market as well as their oscillation ranges before convergence. 
During the first 150 rounds before convergence, the profit curves 
of agents which have higher profits fluctuate more strongly than 
their rivals which have less profit in the same market. The more 
their profits differ, the clearer this trend is observed.  
For example, Fig. 7 above illustrates the evolution of profits 
of Gen6 and Gen12 in the Belgian electricity market. This is a 
highly concentrated market where Gen6 predominates over 
Gen12. Gen6 gains much higher profits than Gen12 and its profit 
curve swings significantly before convergence at round 150. 
Gen12, in contrast, has a pretty stable curve. 
 
 Fig. 7.  Individual profit evolution in highly concentrated markets 
In less concentrated markets, for example, the Netherlands 
(see Fig. 8), the same tendency can be observed, although the 
gap between agents’ profit values as well as the difference 
between their profit curves’ oscillation are much smaller than 
that in highly concentrated markets. 
 
Fig. 8.  Individual profit evolution in less concentrated markets 
C. Comparison 
Fig. 9 compares the average market clearing prices in 8 
countries of the agent-based simulation with the results of the 
Lab Average as well as the individual labs KUL-08 and KUL-10. 
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Apart from the extreme case of KUL-08, in general, market 
clearing prices at the 8 nodes of the agent-based model are 
higher than those of students’ experiments. The gaps between 
prices under the two approaches in these nodes are rather high: 
1700 compared to 1097 EUR/MWh in France, or 1323 
compared to 437 EUR/MWh in Austria. In the meantime, in 
nodes where the prices of the Lab Average are higher than those 
of the agent-based model (Belgium, Italy), the difference is not 
that large. 
  
Fig. 9.  Price comparison between the two approaches 
Unlike prices, the individual profits of generators in the agent-
based model completely surpass those of the students’ 
experiments, with a large difference (Fig. 10). Individual profits 
of every generator as agent are superior to those of generators 
played by students. Gen4, for example, gets a total profit of 52 
million EUR in the agent-based model but only 24 million EUR 
in the Lab Average or 30 and 12 million EUR in KUL-08 and 
KUL-10 respectively.  
 
Fig. 10.  Individual profits comparison between the two approaches 
V. DISCUSSION 
Quantitative results presented in the previous section shows 
that computational agents achieved higher generators’ profits 
than students in the given market simulation. It is however 
difficult to conclude which agent or method is superior. In what 
follows, we discuss the comparability of the two approaches in 
the way we have applied them, and we also identify 
improvements that would need to be made to the market test 
suite to permit more conclusive comparisons from future 
experiments. 
A. Agents’ motivation 
Controlling players’ motivation is the most important but 
challenging task of laboratory experiments. The motivation that 
an experiment can provide to its human subjects can be intrinsic 
or extrinsic. Experimental economics literature often stresses the 
importance of extrinsic motivation using monetary incentives. 
Gneezy and Rustichini [34] however showed that monetary 
compensation does not always induce higher performance. If 
participants perceive the experiment as a monetary environment, 
their efforts will be determined by the reward. A small payoff 
can therefore lead to worse performance than no payoff at all. 
The psychology literature puts even more emphasis on intrinsic 
motivation. Rydval and Ortmann [35] for instance found that 
cognitive abilities could be twice as important as financial 
incentives. Others have warned that money may have 
detrimental effects on motivation [34]. Educational experiments 
where students are agents usually use grades as alternative 
extrinsic incentives while often emphasizing the importance of 
inducing intrinsic motivation in the simulation games they offer 
to students [36]-[40]. The intrinsic motivation of students comes 
from their interests in doing actions which are new and fun to 
them, and can also come from the element of competition 
against oneself or others [38].  
In this paper, students have been mainly intrinsically 
motivated to maximize profits in the game. A survey organized 
by the didactics unit of the university that performed an audit of 
the game [20] did confirm students’ motivation to play the game 
and learn how to maximize profits during the laboratory sessions. 
However, when compared to computational agents which are 
programmed to maximize profits, the motivation of students 
seems to be uncontrollable and incompatible. As money (i.e. 
profits) is the incentive of computational agents, a compatible 
extrinsic incentive should be given to students. Besides grades 
for the participation, grades proportional to the profit students 
earned could motivate students as strongly as the profit 
motivation to real traders. By that means, or by actual payments, 
the motivation gap between the two approaches could be 
mitigated. 
B. Cognitive issues and expertise 
While agents learn and update their data at a constant rate as 
they are programmed, humans, in contrast, often have a 
decreasing rate in their learning function. At a certain point, 
when knowledge reaches a certain level, learning is slower 
because it depends on a subjective assessment of efforts and 
gains, which is difficult to model. According to Hayek [27], this 
assessment is influenced by time, location, context, personal 
knowledge, perception, preferences, and other factors. Together 
they impose cognitive constraints6 upon human decision-making 
process. In addition, when making decisions, individuals and 
organizations often rely on simple heuristics in an adaptive way 
and “ignoring part of the information can lead to more accurate 
judgments than weighting and adding all information” [41]. This 
is not the case of computational agents which are programmed to 
make careful decisions based on all information available to 
them.  
                                                            
6  How cognitive characteristics influence an individual decision-maker are 
extensively discussed in psychology literature, especially concerning “bounded 
rationality” [28] and “heuristic decision making” [36]. 
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The results of the KUL lab sessions above provide a clear 
illustration of the influence of cognitive issues on students’ 
results. There is a large variation between individual sessions 
and between each of them with the average data. In particular, 
lab KUL-08 achieves much higher profit results due to the fact 
that one student started with a very high mark-up, leading all 
other students to behave similarly (heuristics decision). In 
addition, results of students in the laboratory are also more fickle 
than those of computational agents, perhaps explained by the 
absence of variations in cognitive characteristics in the agent-
based model.  
Students in the educational laboratory however could not 
represent the choices by traders in reality due to their lack of 
expertise. Different groups of students or even different students 
also have different knowledge and learning speeds which are 
hard to control for unless a careful selection of participants is 
made. Computational agents’ expertise, in contrast, is more 
controllable. To compare computational and human agents, a 
group of selected trading experts might be more uniform and 
representative of actual trader behavior than students. 
C. Number of rounds and sample size 
Due to limited time resources, our laboratory results include 
only 5 sessions with a maximum of 15 trading rounds for each. 
Comparing to 500 rounds of agent-based simulation, that creates 
a limitation on our comparative illustration and makes it hard to 
discuss the learning curve of the students. 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Convergence of students’ laboratory results (market clearing price of 
lab KUL-08) 
The results that we compare are the outcomes that each 
approach converges to rather than the results they obtain after 
the same number of rounds, which was typically 100 rounds for 
computational agents and only 10 rounds for students (Fig. 11). 
Note however that the quick convergence of students might also 
be partly explained by inadequate motivation due to the lack of 
payment.  
D. Freedom of choice 
Freedom of choice is one advantage of the human agents and 
is hard to model with computational agents who are constrained 
to a predefined limited “action space”. Although our study tried 
to mitigate this factor by including the full range of students’ 
offers into the agents’ action domain, it could have an important 
impact on the results. Future comparisons need to reduce this 
inconsistency by either limiting possible choices for the human 
agents or increasing the action domain of computational agents. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the market test suite that we designed for students to learn 
about electricity market design and market behavior, 
computational agents outperform the groups of students we have 
had over the years.  
The approach used does not allow us to generalize from this 
result, but the results do illustrate that this is a promising line of 
research that merits further investigation, and we have identified 
recommendations for further research. 
A first improvement could be to motivate students 
extrinsically by grading them proportionally to their earned 
profits in the laboratory sessions, or to make actual monetary 
payments. Note that the number of rounds in which students 
trade would then also need to be increased to allow this 
increased motivation to result in improved learning. 
A second improvement could be to align better the action 
domain of students with that of agents, which could be done by 
reducing the action domain of students in the market test suite 
we developed.  
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